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Abstract 
Iran is facing a daunting reality regarding the future of their water resources 
which may result in conflict and migration within the country with the potential to affect 
the Middle East and North African region and beyond. The country has failed to address 
critical preservation, risk mitigation, infrastructural, and political efforts to accommodate 
their rising population due to economic expansion. Water resources are dependent on 
social, political, economic, and environmental variables related to conflict and migration. 
Given the recent examples of water security issues in Syria resulting in migration and 
conflict, this thesis investigates the total available water per capita as a driver for the 
potential collapse of Iran’s water resources. Portions of two key world system dynamics 
models were combined to identify interrelated variables leading to migration and conflict. 
It was found through multiple simulations that decreasing water per capita levels leads to 
increases in aggregated migration and death rates for this particular investigation. Further 
experimentation with other interrelated variables such as civil liberties, level of 
government, and GDP per capita may highlight other drivers and allow extension of this 
model to other countries of interest.  
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WATER SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING MIGRATION AND CONFLICT IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
I.  Introduction 
Recent conflicts and migrations around the globe have drawn the attention of 
military strategists and leaders who are interested in which environments are particularly 
vulnerable to impact stability, especially when conflict is imminent. Conflict and 
migration are complex issues which become even more convoluted when combined. 
Military forces conducting offensive, defensive, sustainment, and humanitarian 
operations must understand how to adapt to these issues within a given operational 
environment.  
There are a number of varying degrees of interdependency between water 
security, migration, and conflict within a region, country, or population. These causes can 
vary in intensity, frequency, and influence each other resulting in complex 
interdependencies. They are linked through social, economic, political, and 
environmental aspects within a community, country, and region. Within these aspects, 
there are both exclusive and common variables at play, weighing on the potential 
outcomes. 
Major events involving water security, conflict, and migration have recently 
occurred in countries such as Sudan, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. For example, Syria suffered 
from an extensive drought from 2006-2010 that negatively affected their agricultural 
sector, forcing an internal migration from rural to urban areas as farmers and pastoralists 
sought employment and social opportunities. As resources became more overexploited, 
tensions in cities such as Aleppo and Damascus inevitably rose, resulting in protests and 
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ultimately violence as the oppressive Assad-backed regime stepped in to the unrest. Civil 
war ensued, millions became internally displaced or left the country altogether to flee 
conflict and enjoy opportunities in a safer environment.  
The fragility of Syria is not unique to the region of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). Most of the countries suffer from some level of resource scarcity, 
especially water, mostly due to rising populations, arid conditions, and waning 
preservation efforts in the form of sustainability, services, and risk mitigation [1]. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) is of particular interest due to a rapidly expanding 
population that has more than doubled in the last 40 years. This growth is coupled with 
the consumption of water at an unprecedented rate due to a lack of more modern and 
sustainable resource, risk, and service management. Iran’s water resources are being 
overexploited as their agricultural sector continues over abstraction of fossil aquifers and 
transboundary surface waters even after investing millions in dam infrastructure to meet 
self-imposed food self-sufficiency directives [2].  
Iran recently has experienced violent protests due to rising costs and reduced 
government subsidies in the wake of lifting trade sanctions. Iran experienced a huge 
economic growth as inflation rates soared and the government supported subsidies on key 
commodities such as fuel under President Ahmadinejad in preparation for sanctions being 
lifted. As President Rouhani ushered in new impositions on Iranians to reduce 
government spending, a backlash by the people has ensued due to waning subsidies, lack 
of employment opportunities, and dwindling resources. This example generalizes a link 
between water security and conflict as a simple introduction to the complexities they 
share.  
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The purpose of this research is to identify potential triggers signaling the collapse 
of Iran’s water resources and possible subsequent incidences of conflict and migration. 
Extensive research on the subjects of water security, conflict, and migration are necessary 
to systematically qualify and quantify variables linking these subjects through social, 
political, economic, and environmental lenses. Applying these variables towards a 
simulation model provides a framework for the investigation of future incidences in Iran 
and other countries of interest. 
Background of the Problem 
The United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM, has expressed an 
interest in understanding and analyzing the burgeoning issue of water security and its 
potential interdependency with migration and conflict. Water security has become more 
prevalent in recent decades as populations grow, pollution spreads, and populations 
engage in conflict over resources. Special Forces units operate in environments where 
resources are often scarce, typically before the sustainment offered by large scale 
campaigns and operations is established. Sustainment operations enable a force to 
continue operations without significant lack of proper supplies and materials. Operating 
in an environment without sustainment or sufficient supplies to source in the host nation 
limits the reach and capabilities of any force. While the former point is interesting, the 
purpose of this thesis focuses on identifying the potential sensitivity of the scarcity and 
triggers of these issues so as to enable forces operating in austere environments suffering 
from migration, water security, and/or conflict.  
4 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
 This research focuses on the water security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) 
along with potential affects due to migration and conflict. Other aspects of Iran will be 
included in order to reinforce an understanding of these topics as it relates to the research, 
but not so much as to obscure the overall intent.    
 Iran possesses several water sources from key geographical features allowing one 
of the highest usages of water for agricultural purposes (see Figure 1). Iran covers 1.75 M 
km2 and is bordered by, Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east, the Gulf of Oman, the 
Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to the south, Iraq and Turkey to the west, and 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan to the north. The majority of 
land is desert and mountains, some of which rise above 2000 m. The large Central 
Plateau covers more than half of the country, includes a salt swamp, and is located 
between several mountain chains. Nearly 30 percent of the land is cultivable, of which 
approximately 40 percent is utilized annually. Iran is a semi-arid to arid country with 
extreme temperature fluctuations (55oC to -30oC) and a rainfall average of 275 mm with 
the majority of precipitation arriving in the winter months [3].  
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Figure 1: Major Iranian Water Features 
(Source: UN FAO AQUASTAT) 
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 Iran is a country of 80.2 million people with nearly three-quarters of them 
residing in urban areas, contrasting the fact that 92 percent of the country’s water is for 
agricultural use versus nearly seven percent for municipal use and just over one percent 
for industrial usage. Population growth is the starting point for water issues in Iran; its 
population more than doubled since the Revolution in 1979. The capital city of Tehran 
contains over 18 percent of the population. As the spatial distribution of population grows 
more toward the cities, water resources must move as well. As Iran continues toward the 
stated goal of food self-sufficiency, water is overexploited from both renewable and 
nonrenewable resources in an effort to grow an increasing amount of food. 
 Other issues plague Iran’s precious water resources while the country struggles 
towards becoming a global economic power. The country relies on 60 percent of its water 
from sustainable or renewable sources with more than 55 percent originating from 
groundwater versus surface water. In addition, small fraction of water is sourced through 
desalinization. Water tariffs are very low and subsidies high in Iran. Up until recently, 
fuel prices were affordable for nearly all residents, allowing inefficient pumping and 
over-abstraction of groundwater. Iran built hundreds of small and large dams in an effort 
to combat population spatial distribution as well as support the agricultural efforts, but 
many of these dam systems are now unused due to inadequate flow and a plethora of 
environmental issues.  
Iran has a rich history of water management. The Persians developed the qanat 
millennia ago in order to transport water under the surface towards irrigation reservoirs, 
which many are still maintained and used today. Iran continues using technology and has 
invested in modern inter-basin water transfer (IWT) projects to connect water rich areas 
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near the mountain watersheds and Caspian Sea towards urban areas, although not without 
controversy. These efforts are largely done to offset insufficient water resources, but also 
as mitigation for environmental issues such as droughts and floods. Other environmental 
issues include potential climate change affects, wastewater mismanagement, 
desalinization affects, and a lack of conservancy awareness on behalf of the population 
and government.  
Iran’s government has failed to properly manage water resources, infrastructure, 
and risk mitigating efforts for the increasing demands of a growing population. In the 
next chapter, several of these issues will be further explored and compared with other 
countries who shared similar water resource failures and subsequently endured migration 
and/or conflict events. Many of these issues are not unlike the situation in the U.S. 
southwest, where the Colorado River has been overexploited for decades by huge 
aqueducts diverting water towards Californian cities. The Colorado now fails to run its 
natural course to the Gulf of California in Mexico.  
Statement of the Problem  
Currently, no regional dynamic water security models exist that incorporate 
migration and conflict. Several global models exist that have predicted available water 
resources [4]–[6]. Other local models forecast water security, but lack interactions of 
migration and conflict [7]–[9]. Extensive research has been conducted on water security 
—causes, effects, predicted outcomes, policy reforms, and resource securitization to 
name a few [10]–[12]. Additionally, U.S. water provision and management efforts have 
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varied domestically and with foreign states which is evident from large infrastructure 
nation building project conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 [13, p. 30].  
The majority of human migratory models include the ‘push-pull’ or gravity 
theory, where origin-nation factors are ‘pushing’ individuals away and host-nation factors 
are ‘pulling’ individuals towards their borders. These models allow researchers to explain 
the migratory structure based on a population’s reaction towards origin and host nations 
events to include an understanding of the consequences of such migration. Fussel et al. 
used micro-level demographics in the form of surveys and to analyze and model 
environmental aspects of human migration [14]. Greenwood investigated migration 
drivers for U.S. citizens between 1965 and 1983 using microdata and time-series data 
based on familial and economic variables [15]. Edwards posits that most research and 
models miss accounting for critical social drivers of migration, linking individual 
decisions with the larger factors affecting their communities [16]. While these researchers 
created fairly accurate migratory models, they noted their results were limited to specific 
instances in time given the available data such that further research on an expanded scale 
would require additional variables.  
The causes of conflict are entrenched in social, political, economic, cultural and 
environmental factors, much like migration. Research often highlights inequalities within 
classes or groups that alienate them based on education, employment, ethnicity, religion, 
clan, and resources. Extensive research has been conducted on the fundamental causes of 
conflict, with particular attention to the horizontal inequalities existing between groups 
within a country or state [17], [18] that required further review for our purpose. Due to 
the inherent nature of warfighting, analyzing causes of conflict for the sponsor has less 
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priority than migration and water security and therefore will be cursory within this 
research.  
Purpose of the Study  
Water security can negatively influence a number of operational capabilities, 
including operational reach, sustainment, and flexibility. Acknowledging water security 
causes in an operational environment enables the Department of Defense, DoD, to 
anticipate and include its effects into mission planning, preparation, and execution. 
Determining a baseline (minimum) number of contributing factors allows other military 
research to more accurately model these interactions in the future. The U.S. military is 
interested in the overall stability of global partners, especially those whose resources are 
scarce and may be of interest for contingency planning. Finally, U.S. efforts to help 
stabilize or reinforce the infrastructure of these developing countries sends powerful 
signals of responsibility and strength to burgeoning and competing superpowers [13]. 
Significance of the Study  
There are a number of potential water scarce environments DoD may conduct 
operations in during the coming years. By anticipating potential water security 
interdependencies of operational and mission variables, DoD may increase readiness and 
reduce the negative influence on operational capabilities. They may also be more 
informed about evolving patterns in other regions of the globe while forecasting planning 
efforts in migration prone regions. This topic also clearly impacts the concepts for human 
aspects in military operations. 
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Significance to Leadership  
Presenting a model capable of simulating the interaction of water security, 
migration, and conflict permits follow on research for expanded models with more 
factors. Expanded models will be more accurate in predicting the effects of additional 
influencers within an operational environment. 
Nature of the Study  
The research and methodologies applied in this thesis are computationally based 
analyses focused in the operational sciences. For the purpose of simulating water 
security, migration and conflict, the primary modeling technique utilized is system 
dynamics (SD). System dynamics offers a holistic approach, incorporating as many 
system elements as possible, with the time available to conduct this research. Statistical 
and linear regression techniques are applied to various continuous data sources in order to 
determine interdependencies between elements and create equations to describe flows 
within the system dynamic model [19]. Scenarios are generated to support a design of 
experiments in order to exercise the limits of available data sources.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Using past and current hydrology and demographic data, this study models water 
security and its effects on migration and conflict by identifying indicators related to the 
stated problem. The state of critical water insecurity, rate of migration, and type of 
conflict will be further defined. Available narrative and analysis sources support Iran’s 
lack of water security. Within this thesis, these sources are explored for corroborating 
data in order to support our modeling and analyses. Prior to addressing the analyses, 
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significant exploration and explanation water security encompassing management, 
sustainment, policy, delivery, economy, environment, and population will also be 
explored in order to address several questions.  
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized 
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas? 
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify a particular country’s water 
security? 
3. Does the amount of per capita renewable water resources available serve as a 
trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within a country? 
These questions are addressed throughout this thesis in order to meet the hypothesis that 
water security fails due to a decrease of per capita renewable water resources available 
below 800 𝑚𝑚3/𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦. This value is selected on the occurrence of internal displacement of 
personnel in Syria prior to the protests in 2011, the proceeding civil war, and mass 
migration and refugee flow from the country. 
Definition of Terms  
A number of key terms are used throughout the research. Water scarcity is the 
lack of sufficient water supply to meet the immediate demands of water users or 
consumers. Water security is the availability and access of sufficient quantities of a safe 
quality in order to sustain livelihoods without negatively affecting the environment in 
order to promote development. Migration is the movement of a person or persons from 
one location to another. People that migrate are called migrants and can be categorized as 
internally displaced persons or refugees. Internally displaced persons are migrants who 
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are without a permanent residence within their legal country of citizenship. Refugees are 
migrants who have been forcibly removed from their residences and either cannot return 
or fearful for their life if they were to return. Refugees can be internally displaced within 
their country or have left the country. Conflict is the disagreement between two or more 
entities. These entities can include, for example, political parties, extremist groups, 
neighboring ethnicities, or combatants. More detailed definitions are presented in the 
literature review of this thesis.   
Study Scope  
Causes of migration and conflict are numerous and their interdependencies 
convoluted. Water security was selected as a hypothesized cause by this research’s 
sponsoring party. The topic of water scarcity is included with the parent issue, water 
security. Simulating water security requires a scientific model, which for this research is 
defined using a system dynamics methodology. 
Study Limitations  
There are many factors causing migration, conflict, and water security 
individually, in addition to an interdependent whole. This research focuses on observable 
data and narrative to combine the extensive research conducted from various disciplines. 
Much of the narrative on water security typically included references to climate change 
including precipitation, temperature, and weather patterns. Associated correlations 
between climate change and its potential causes are not explored in this study. 
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Summary 
 This research includes significant and important insights into modeling and 
simulating water security to identify potential effects on migration and conflict using 
operational science methodologies. The literature review presents a background on the 
topics of water security, migration, conflict, and system dynamics. The models and 
analysis presented in this thesis build on many previous works involving global water 
models. While world water models may showcase scarcity across the globe, a more 
regionalized or localized model is required to simulate water security in support of DoD 
strategies and operational planning efforts in various operational environments.  
Water, migration, and conflict data exist for many industrialized nations. Many of 
the potential operational environments that the DoD is interested in lack sufficient data 
required to perform extensive classical simulation. The methodologies within chapter 
three model and simulate the interdependencies of the variables and elements with 
available open source data. Following the testing and experimentation, analyses are 
performed and results presented in chapter four. Finally, the conclusions of the research 
are presented in chapter five along with offerings for follow on research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Overview 
This chapter presents an overview sources pertinent to water security, migration, 
and conflict, as well as methodologies by which these topics can be modeled. This 
research is dependent on representing the topics accurately to present a robust model for 
simulation. The relationships between the topics are well documented by various experts 
in a wide range of scientific fields including hydrology, climatology, sociology, and 
political science. The available research has stressed, and continues to stress, the 
importance and critical requirement to address water security, conflict, and migration; yet 
a methodology to model the interaction is absent. Additionally, contributing factors to the 
problem both underlap and overlap further convoluting the modeling and simulation 
process. Each topic is examined individually to build a cumulative knowledge of the 
problem and how it applies in the country of Iran. Issues, subjects, and data pertinent to 
Syria and Iran will be included to support and reinforce the subsequent modeling and 
simulation in later chapters. 
Water Security 
 Water security was defined by Grey, Sadoff, and Claudia [20, p. 546] as the 
availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, 
ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to 
people, environments, and economies. The United Nations (UN) presents an expanded 
definition by stating that water security is  
the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities 
of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and 
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socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne 
pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate 
of peace and political stability [21, p. 1].  
The UN pointed out in their World Water Development report that water security is the 
“availability of a reliable and secure access to water over time.” [12, p. 379]. This 
mention of time is an important characteristic when assessing water scarcity and water 
security.  
Defining water scarcity is necessary when considering water security. Simply 
stated, water scarcity occurs when water supply does not meet water demand. The UN 
reports individuals begin experiencing water stress when the annual supply is less than 
1,700 m3, water scarcity below 1,000 m3, and absolute scarcity below 500 m3 per person 
[12, p. 124]. As an example, recent water shortages in South Africa have restricted Cape 
Town residents to absolute scarcity at 6.6 gallons per day (9.12 m3/year), which equates 
to 0.97% of their total renewable water resources per capita per year [22]. Progressing 
towards a more contextual definition in a seminal work regarding environmental scarcity 
linked to violent conflicts, Homer-Dixon [23] defined the term “environmental scarcity” 
as subjective and not immune to policy or economy. From his perspective, environmental 
scarcity is the result of unequal resource access due to the combination of a decrease in 
quality and quantity of renewable resources along with population growth.    
Water scarcity has been assessed in several ways based primarily on supply and 
demand. However, water scarcity assessments have typically accounted for water 
quantity, not necessarily water quality. Zeng, Liu, and Savenije stated that three known 
water scarcity assessments (Falkenmark index, Criticality ratio, and IWMI indicator) fail 
to account for water quality and a fourth assessment, water poverty index, is complicated 
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to calculate or explain [24]. Their research applied a new water scarcity index since water 
use, pollution, and excessive withdrawal impacts affects not only water quantity, but 
water quality. Nevertheless, the state of water quality and scarcity requires an 
understanding of water resources, and in particular, the country of interest, Iran. 
Water Resources 
Iran relies very little on external water resources and is therefore dependent upon 
precipitation to recharge groundwater aquifers and replenish flow to the watershed. 
Watersheds naturally transport water to lakes, rivers, oceans, and aquifers while man-
made aqueducts channel water to or from rivers and reservoirs, usually formed by a dam.       
As mentioned in the introduction, the majority of the water in Iran is sourced internally 
from surface water, which is comprised of water flowing over or stored on or above the 
ground level. Surface water includes transboundary rivers originate in other countries, but 
may transit through to a downstream country, or may cease within before reaching 
another body of water.  
Water for use and consumption originates from the natural water cycle, which 
includes the watershed, and from deep underground in fossil aquifers. Fossil aquifers are 
formed over thousands of years as water seeps through the Earth’s crust layers into sealed 
caverns. Fossil aquifers are considered non-renewable water resources due to the time 
required to fill them. These aquifers are typically quite deep, some down to 2,000 m 
below the surface, and often require a great deal of specialized technology and energy to 
extract. For this reason, most countries have focused their attention towards renewable 
water resources as non-renewable water resources cannot be certain to hold sufficient 
quantities or quality for use and consumption. 
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Renewable Water Resources 
 Water resources are quantified through physical measurements and qualitatively 
assessed through various social, economic, political, and environmental aspects. 
Quantitatively, water resources are determined through the stocks and flows of total 
renewable water resources [25], which are further defined by internal and external or 
IRWR and ERWR, for brevity. A nation’s internal resources, consists of both surface and 
groundwater available from the land, are calculated based on surface runoff, groundwater 
recharge, groundwater drainage, and seepage. These quantities are modelled [26] as: 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼 + 𝐼𝐼 − (𝑄𝑄𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)��������� (1) 
where R is the surface runoff, the total volume of the long-term average annual flow of 
surface water generated by direct runoff from endogenous precipitation, I is the 
groundwater recharge, generated from precipitation within the country, Qout is the 
groundwater drainage into rivers (typically, base flow of rivers), and Qin is the seepage 
from rivers into aquifers. The bracketed portion of equation (1) is the overlap 
representing the shared quantity of ground and surface water (since both are measured 
separately and therefore by subtracting the overlap accounts for the total quantity). 
Evaporation is also considered in the total estimated IRWR, especially in arid 
lands where surface runoff is prevalent and therefore is accounted for by separate 
measurements [26]. Several arid countries can have evaporation rates near 50 percent of 
the total estimated IRWR, which significantly reduces the total renewable water resources 
(TRWR). Countries with water stored in large surface areas can lose up to 100 percent of 
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their IRWR, although “loss” is categorized by whether the water contributes to biomass 
production [25]. Evaporation is accounted for in the data used throughout this research. 
 Quantifying external renewable water resources, or ERWR, accounts for more 
variables than IRWR since there are social and political aspects (treaties) to consider. 
ERWR is estimated using: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗ + 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where SWin1 is the volume of surface water entering the country, which is not submitted 
to treaties, SWin2 is the volume of surface water entering the country which is secured 
through treaties, SWPR is the accounted flow of border rivers, SWPL is the accounted part 
of shared lakes, SWout* is the volume of surface water leaving the country which is 
reserved by treaties for downstream countries, and GWin is the groundwater entering the 
country. This study is focused on IRWR, particularly groundwater, considering Iran has 
limited ERWR and surface water can be visually monitored whereas exact groundwater 
storage and capacities are less known. 
Water Security Issues 
The state of water security within a country and its relation to migration and 
conflict requires social, economic, political, and environmental perspectives.  The World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development defined 
state fragility as periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or 
legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, 
making them vulnerable to violence [27, p. 85]. They stress the importance of 
governments and associated institutions such as nongovernment organizations (NGO) in 
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determining the risks associated with fragility so as to acknowledge and avoid potential 
paths to conflict. It is pertinent to recognize the dynamic nature of fragility in regards to 
water security.   
Fragility is linked to a number of other security issues such as social, political, 
health, personal, food, energy, and environmental [28]. These issues are dependent—
when water insecurity is present, a state of fragility usually follows as one or more 
insecurities prevail. Failures are not mutually exclusive within the securities. Fragility, 
conflict, and violence can be the cause of these failures, and these failures can exacerbate 
fragility, conflict, and violence [28]. Homer-Dixon hypothesized the interaction of 
securities with sources of fragility including environmental, social, economic, population 
growth, and resource distribution may interact to cause conflict [23]. He described 
several examples in countries where conflict was and was not present based on that 
country’s ability to adapt, but stresses more research is required.   
Conflicts of any kind are rarely, if ever, attributable to single causes. As such, any 
analysis or efforts at reducing the risks of conflict must consider a multitude of complex 
relationships and contributing factors, including water [29].  Gleick stated that 
populations have been warring over water resources for more than 4500 years, beginning 
in Mesopotamia and most recently between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria [30].  Femia and 
Werrell acknowledged a number of underlying causes of the Syrian civil war that erupted 
in 2011, including a number of social, economic, environmental, and climatic changes 
[31].  From 2006 to 2010, Syrians experienced a drought causing water shortages in more 
than 60 percent of the arable cultivated land. The lead to crop and livestock failures, 
ultimately resulting in millions without their livelihoods and driven to migration. Civil 
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unrest began in March of 2011 in Syria, rapidly escalating into full conflict as it was 
exploited by internal and external factors. This conflict is ongoing.  
Research and discussion pertaining to water scarcity and security generally 
mention climate change. King pointed out in an article examining water stress and 
violence that climate change in Syria caused third and fourth order effects on populations, 
including food security issues, which includes water scarcity [32]. Gleick explained the 
effects of climate change ranging from geopolitical relations to food and water scarcity 
with several prominent sources [29]. Syria is particularly prone to the effects from 
climate change considering recent droughts in the early 2000’s along with poor water 
usage, governmental cooperation, and continued violent conflict. Conversely, a study 
performed in Iran using 79 climatological reporting station over 36 years resulted in a 
lack of evidence supporting climate change [33]. The study determined there were no 
appreciable increases in temperature or decreases in precipitation, but the authors did 
conclude that some may be inclined to consider climate change as a cause of water 
scarcity due to a decrease in precipitation during drought years [33, p. 8].  
Researchers have found a lack of water security can be related to conflict, but 
there are many complex interdependencies between causes that have not been studied. 
Peter Gleick, president of the Pacific Institute, maintains a chronological list containing 
all known water-related conflicts dating back to 3000 BC [30]. He states that while there 
are binned reasons for each conflict, the study and analysis of water-related conflict is not 
a “clean, precise field of study” [30].  Others posit that many experts seek a direct linkage 
between water scarcity (which includes natural variability), migration (and refugee 
flows), and conflict [34]. Jägerskog and Swain argued “that it is important not to draw 
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hasty conclusions in terms of causal linkages in this respect” [34, p. 4]. Fluctuating 
factors such as climate change, seasonal resource variability, disease outbreaks, lapses in 
basic services (infrastructure), and socio-economic statuses cannot be isolated along with 
water security as root causes.   
Recent Examples and Potential Causes 
The outcomes discussed in the previous section were held to be clearly the result 
of inadequate water securities, or simply water insecurities, and a combination of other 
factors. In the most recent World Bank publication on water security assessments of the 
MENA region, researchers explored water security fundamentals including resource 
sustainability and efficiency management, reliability and affordability of services, and 
risk management of potential water-related events [1, p. xxix]. All countries in the 
MENA region endure significant water scarcity. However, they have adopted strategies 
in attempts to compensate for their failure to support the aforementioned fundamentals in 
some form or another. The failure of the Syrian government to support water security 
fundamentals serves as a comparison for a potentially similar outcome in Iran.  
Syria 
As previously noted, drought has been a frequently cited cause of the conflict and 
subsequent internal displacement and migration within Syria since 2011. It is prudent to 
mention that droughts occurred more than 50 percent of the time in the last 50 years 
within Syria. But isolating drought as a primary driver of such events excludes many 
social, economic, and political aspects that must be investigated. Natural resource 
mismanagement occurred over long periods of time in Syria resulting in increases in 
poverty, corruption, rural-urban divide, and unemployment along with decreases in state 
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subsidies, agricultural and livestock production, and food exports [35, p. 521]. Several 
researchers believe Basher al-Assad is to blame for the conflict in Syria since al-Assad 
aimed to increase Syria’s world market appeal to the World Trade Organization by 
converting the centrally planned market economy to a social market economy by cutting 
subsidies to reduce the growing budget deficit [35], [36].  
Culturally and politically, water is a sensitive topic in Syria since the government 
focused on increasing water supply with little regard for available renewable water 
resources. Government water management is divided: a hopeful modernization effort 
driven by construction and irrigation and unrealistic goalsetting by corrupt, ineffective 
policy makers aimed to exploit all resources [35]. Water data is unequally collected and 
assessed by a number of resource managing ministries and agencies within the country 
causing differences in estimates and degrading efficacy. Furthermore, corruption is fueled 
by rivalries between agencies, poorly paid senior leadership, and the practice of nepotism 
and clientism [35], [36].  
The 2009 reduction in fuel subsidies in Syria was a way to control the over-
abstraction of groundwater occurring since the 1960’s. Farmers depleted groundwater 
resources by running diesel pumps with subsidized, inexpensive fuel in order to increase 
productivity to meet rising demands. The immediate effect of cutting fuel subsidies 
shocked the agricultural workers. Without sufficient fuel, farmers either chose to use 
limited funds on fuel to irrigate their crops and then were unable to transport them to 
market, or abandon their land altogether [35]. As agricultural yields decreased without 
subsidized fuel and fertilizer, Syria began losing their position in the global economy as 
the government blamed the outcome on drought. 
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The rapid rise of groundwater wells to support government-encouraged large-
scale irrigation for water intense crops like cotton largely occurring from the 1970s to the 
late 1990s depleted several aquifer levels from 6 to 100 m. Slowly realizing the reality of 
this huge over-abstraction of groundwater, the government unsuccessfully attempted to 
impose licensing restriction on all illegal wells in 2005 [37]. Aquifers in the Hassakeh 
governate in the northeast of Syria dried up causing migration and the Barada River in 
Damascus that once fed lush gardens is now all but a trickle [38]. As of 2010, over 30 
percent of Syria’s population was experiencing high or extremely high groundwater 
stress, above the MENA average of 23 percent [1]. Syria’s over-abstraction of 
groundwater compromises between 20 to 50 percent of environmental flow requirements, 
undoubtedly due to a high (>90%) agricultural irrigation demand [1]. Syria’s once 
plentiful water resources were subjected to exploitation by a growing population, over-
abstraction, and an economically motivated and corrupt governance first unknowingly 
and subsequently with disregard to a devastatingly environmental and humanitarian 
crisis, which ultimately led to war. 
Coupled with the mismanagement occurring in Syria, drought still played a major 
roll, especially during the 2008 growing season. Wheat production dropped 47% from 
2007’s season, coinciding with the driest winter in the same year and causing a loss of 
green water availability for agricultural use (Green water availability is reliant on 
precipitation to replenish soil and higher amounts usually lower blue water consumption 
[39]). The drought affected the majority of the agricultural community as precipitation 
levels fell to 15-30 percent of annual averages [11].  
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Figure 2: Syrian Provincial Rainfall 
Syria heavily relies on external surface water (72.36 percent) and over twice the 
dependency of Iran on overall surface to groundwater (12.63 km3 to 6.174 km3). Syria’s 
overall water consumption of total available renewable water resources rose from 19 
percent in 1977 to 99 percent as of 2007 [3]. Their total internal freshwater (surface and 
groundwater) withdrawals have risen from 46.8 percent in 1977 to 235 percent in 2007. 
Farming populations in the northeast province of Hassakeh were most affected beginning 
in 2006 and into the 2007-2008 planting season, resulting in the internal displacement of 
36,000 families [40].  
(Source: USDA) 
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Figure 3: Drought Affected Syrian Families as of 2009  
Initially, impacts were estimated at 1.3 million people affected including 803,000 
farmers and pastoralists (80 percent losing livelihoods subsiding on 50 percent of daily 
caloric intake) [40]. According to Mohamad Alloush, director of the environment 
department at the State Planning Commission (SPC), the drought forced 250,000-300,000 
families (at least 1.25-1.5 million people) to leave their villages and concentrate in the 
suburbs of Damascus and other cities like Aleppo and Daa’ra [41]. Fortunately, wheat 
production rebounded, but continued its pre-drought decline throughout the duration of 
the conflict. 
Many other contributing issues stemming from water security affected Syrians. 
Water supply service in Syria declined by 70 percent between 2011 and 2013 due to 
conflict as dissident groups and militaries fought to control supply [42]. Decline in water 
supply usually is accompanied by a decline in water quality. Water-borne diseases in 
poor quality water cause increases in diarrhea related deaths, especially in children. In 
Syria, these deaths accounted for 14.4 percent of all deaths of children under five years of 
age, far higher than other MENA countries. Poor sanitation and hygiene become life 
(Source: UN Syria Drought Response) 
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threatening issues for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) as conflict and 
migration continued. Other issues influenced by the status of water security in Syria 
include migration and conflict, which are addressed in separate sections further in this 
study. 
Water Resource Metrics 
A drastic loss of available water resources in a short period of time can certainly 
be portrayed as a primary effect of drought, especially when other less commonly 
understood causes are absent. Kumma et al. presented a methodology for water scarcity 
and stress trajectories based on per capita consumption in 𝑚𝑚3/𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 [39]. They state water 
scarcity is population driven; the available resources insufficiently satisfy an increasing 
large population. Water stress is a demand driven influence based on the amount used, 
regardless of the population. Kummu et al. define per capita use as equations (3) and (4), 
which are equivalent.  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
= 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  (3) 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑢𝑢𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 ∗ 𝑢𝑢ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑔𝑔𝑤𝑤 (4) 
 
Within their study, Kummu et al. defined water scarcity and stress levels based on long-
term decadal scale availability, consumption, and population data for the world (Table 1). 
Table 1: Shortage and Stress Thresholds 
Threshold Shortage (𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑/capita/year) Stress (Percentage of Water Consumed) 
Moderate 1700 20 
High 1000 40 
(Source: Kumma et al.) 
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Regionally MENA, representing 17 percent of the global population, faces both water 
scarcity and stress. Syria’s land area is a ‘stress first’ archetype defined by Kummu et al. 
(Table 2) as a result of demand driven per capita water use given the amount of water 
available prior to a water shortage. Iran is defined by the ‘stress and shortage at same 
time’ archetype, indicating per capita consumption occurred along with exceeding the 
stress point (>20%). The authors define the water scarcity trajectories based on the 
Falkenmark water scarcity matrix that combines stress and shortage values along per 
capita consumption iso-lines in order to highlight the drivers (Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
Since Syria falls into a ‘stress first’ archetype based on Table 2, the authors posit that 
demand is typically prioritized before supply, resulting in increased per capita 
consumption.  
Table 2: Trajectory Types 
 
(Source: Kumma et al.) 
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Using (3), (4) and referenced values, calculations indicate Syria was experiencing water 
scarcity and stress leading up to the civil war and subsequent migration (Table 3). This 
thesis utilizes these calculated figures in scenarios modeling Syrian and Iranian water 
balance.  
Table 3: Estimated Stress, Shortage, and Consumption 
Country Reference Population Water 
Availability 
(𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑/year) 
Water Use 
(𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑/year) 
Stress  Shortage  Per Capita 
Consumption, 
(𝒎𝒎𝟑𝟑/capita/year) 
Iran Tehran 
Times, 2018 
8.02E+07  8.80E+10  9.70E+10  1.1023 1097.2569 1209.4763 
FAO, 
AQUASTAT 
7.91E+07 
(2015) 
1.37E+11 
(2014) 
9.33E+10 
(2004) 
0.6810 1731.9848 1179.5196 
Syria GTZ, 2007 1.77E+07 1.56E+10 1.92E+10 1.2308 881.3559 1084.7458 
FAO, 
AQUASTAT 
1.85E+07 
(2015) 
1.68E+10 
(2014) 
1.68E+10 
(2005) 
0.9976 908.1081 905.9459 
 
 
Figure 4: Falkenmark Water Scarcity Matrix 
(Source: Richey et al.) 
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Figure 5: Water Scarcity Trajectories 
Research into measuring available groundwater has included satellite technology 
rather than pure terrestrial means. Using NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Climate 
Experiment (GRACE) data, Richey et al. measured the groundwater depletion rates of 
major world aquifers in 2015, but none of which are within Syrian borders [43]. Voss et 
al. analyzed groundwater availability using a combination of GRACE data and remote 
sensors in the Tigris and Euphrates River basins and western Iran from 2003 to 2009 and 
found disturbing rates of groundwater storage [44]. These data support the trend of 
declining groundwater storage levels in an area encompassing portions of Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and western Iran along with Lake Daryace, Lake 
Van, Lake Tharthar, the Asad Reservoir, and the Qadisiyah Reservoir.  
With no major deep aquifer below Syria or Iran, the studies by Kummu et al. and 
Voss et al. highlight aggregated global and regional quantities and consumption, 
(Source: Richey et al.) 
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respectively. Joodaki et al. utilized higher resolution GRACE data along with 562 active 
well observations sourced from the Iran Water Resources Management Company in order 
to determine monthly averages of total groundwater storage in Iran [45]. Their total 
groundwater storage estimates account for naturally occurring and anthropogenic 
components across most of the Middle East region and a portion of North Africa (Figure 
6).  
 
Figure 6: GRACE Data Coverage 
Groundwater storage estimates were isolated by subtracting soil moisture, snow, 
canopy storage, and river storage changes along with Caspian Sea and large lake 
contributions. Joodaki et al. scaled each country estimate and applied a parametric test at 
a 95 percent confidence interval before comparing GRACE coefficients with Iranian 
observed well data. The authors caveat that increases in monthly storage data may be 
anthropogenic considering that broad-scale irrigation is typically practiced, and that a 
portion of the increases could be due to recharge from runoff and seepage [45]. 
Regardless of monthly groundwater storage increases, significant decreases in total 
groundwater storage were observed from both GRACE coefficients and well data (Figure 
7).  
(Source: Joodaki et al.) 
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Figure 7: Groundwater Storage Estimates 
Overestimated well data may have resulted in the larger (black line) loss versus 
GRACE coefficient estimates, but the authors state GRACE data did include an area 
extending past the Iranian border due to a sensitivity kernel.  
Iranian Issues 
 Madani published a paper in Iranian Studies in 2016 outlining many of the 
drought-related issues affecting Iran [2]. Population growth, pollution, agricultural self-
sufficiency, fuel and water subsidies, and unbalanced infrastructure have influenced 
water security in Iran, but mismanagement and unsustainable usage are the major factors 
in shortages. Even though Iran’s water history includes the Persian development of 
qanats, 2,500-year-old underground aqueducts channeling groundwater to reservoirs for 
agricultural irrigation still widely used in the region, economic growth, urban expansion, 
and competition with the world trade market is unsustainably depleting water resources. 
Additionally, land subsidence, deteriorating water quality, desertification, eutrophication, 
and erosion are problems plaguing a country once famous for its sustainable water 
practices [2].  
(Source: Joodaki et al.) 
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 As Iran’s population rate of change decreases from its height during the 
Revolution, the government anticipates a 1.3 percent increase to balance age distribution. 
Current population in Iran is 80.2 million with a rate of change +1.14 percent (for 2016) 
[46]. As shown in Figure 8, annual increase of population indicates a stabilizing trend as 
the variance between high and low amplitudes decreases. Madani’s research stated the 
urban population growth runs counter to the water resource locations, stressing existing 
infrastructure within cities. Nearly all of the urban and three-quarters of the rural 
population has access to clean water, but most consume more than twice the global 
average at 250 liters per person, per day, which equates to 250 𝑝𝑝 ∗ 365 𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦𝑢𝑢 =91250 𝑝𝑝/𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦 or 91.25 𝑚𝑚3/𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦. This quantity represents the municipal portion of the 
total water resources per capita in Table 3.  
 
Figure 8: Iranian Population Trends 
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Since 92.18 percent of water in Iran is used for agricultural purposes, municipal and 
industrial use is divided into 6.645 percent and 1.179 percent, respectively, which puts 
the urban daily estimate in a sensible range given the variance in years. 
 Iran relies on oil for the majority of its GDP, although it is determined to be food 
self-sufficient as are many other MENA countries due to their vulnerability to food 
shortages from limited water, large populations, and political instability [2]. Virtual water 
imports are a contentious topic in Iran [47], but self-sufficiency goals challenge 
remaining water resources, infrastructure, and services. Water is still quite inexpensive in 
Iran, as are gasoline, diesel, cooking gas, and electricity because Iran is an oil-based 
economy. Efforts to cut subsidies across several five-year plans to reduce a $100 billion 
program were meant to stabilize consumption and privatize services such as 
transportation. Cuts in subsidies created backlash from the population, causing policy 
makers to provide cash handouts to nearly everyone as an offset. Instead of boosting the 
economy by convincing rural workers to seek more lucrative employment in urban 
centers, rural populations remained in the country side and lived off of the government 
handouts [48].  
 Dams offered much promise for water sustainability in Iran. At one point after the 
Revolution Iran was the third largest dam builder in the world. Despite several hundred 
dams built and hundreds more planned, many sit empty as watersheds and river flows 
dried up due to over abstraction from irrigation and other uses. Over the decades many 
environmental issues resulted from dams, including human displacement, sedimentation, 
eutrophication, biodiversity damage, and downstream development, caused further issues 
for governing water and energy ministries and agencies.  
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 The number of wells increased in the 1960s as fuel subsidies decreased fuel prices 
in favor of increased production and development [1], [2]. As more wells were drilled to 
meet agricultural demands, groundwater storage levels decreased and fuel consumption 
rose to draw water from lower levels. The Iranian government unsuccessfully attempted 
to curtail illegal well drilling, as the Syrian government attempted to do, by requiring 
permits for all wells. Since water management in Iran is unable to detect and monitor 
wells, the effort was changed to smart water meters, with limited success [49]. 
Nevertheless, the need to control a water source is paramount in a country where 
droughts are common and floods can be devastating.  
Interbasin water transfers are another infrastructure investment the government 
has supported in order to supply urban areas such as Tehran and Zayandeh-Rud located 
towards the center of Iran where resources are scarce. The process desalinates water from 
renewable water sources such as the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman and pump the water 
through an underground pipeline to offset dwindling urban resources. These projects are 
expensive, on the order of hundreds of millions to billions of US dollars, along with 
having high energy requirements. Experts question the value of such endeavors 
suggesting other sustainability, service and risk-mitigating efforts for water resources 
[50]. 
 Similar to Syria, Iran’s water governance structure is mismanaged due to 
insufficient support from political powers. President Ahmadinejad converted the water 
management jurisdiction from watershed-based boundaries to provincial-based causing 
infighting over trans-provincial water resources. Corruption is also a problem affecting 
the long-term goals necessary to prevent environmental crises thus allowing irreversible 
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damage to mount [2]. The population had little environmental awareness until recently 
when water levels in Lake Urmia dropped due to irrigation, upstream storage from dam 
and diversions, and droughts [2], [47], [51]. Public media reports regarding 
environmental issues and events have improved as a result. Other water-related issues are 
noteworthy. These include wastewater management, network losses (leakage rate), 
pollution from nitrates and phosphates (agriculturally sourced), and water-borne diseases.  
Comparison 
 There are many similarities concerning water resources in Syria and Iran, but 
there are differences between the countries themselves. Syria is a lower economic status 
than Iran, mostly due to Iran’s higher GDP [10]. This lower class led to fewer 
investments in Syria. The difference in demographic transition graphs for Iran and Syria 
describe the population trend and act as a potential predictor of total population [52], 
[53]. In Figure 9, birth and death rates in Syria are converging such that the population is 
experiencing a reduction, whereas birth and death rates of change in Iran are moving in 
the same direction. Syria’s birth rate (22.158 births per 1000) is currently falling as death 
rate increases (5.589 deaths per 1000), due in part to the ongoing civil war. These rate 
variations are an indication of a slowly decreasing or potentially slowly increasing total 
population. However, the birth and death rates prior to the beginning of the civil war in 
2009 were trending at a similar rate 27.139 and 3.798, respectively. The population of 
Iran is over three times that of Syria, but the birth and death rates have remained more 
synchronized following the Revolution, which may be indicative of other socio-economic 
factors.  
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Figure 9: Syrian and Iranian Demographic Transition Graphs 
The recent civil war and mass migration have left many services unfilled, setting behind 
on any future developments, maintenance, and repairs of the infrastructure. Iran has a 
much larger population than Syria (80.2 million to 18.3 million) and landmass (636,400 
mi² to 71,498 mi²) requiring more infrastructure and governance. Focusing on the water 
security leads this study towards water availability and consumption by a growing 
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
20
11
20
14
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Ra
te
, C
ru
de
 (p
er
 1
,0
00
)
Year
Demographic Transition - Syria, 1960-2015
Birth Death Population, total
(Source: World Bank)
0
10000000
20000000
30000000
40000000
50000000
60000000
70000000
80000000
90000000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
20
11
20
14
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Ra
te
, C
ru
de
 (p
er
 1
00
0)
Year
Demographic Transition - Iran, 1960-2015
Birth Death Population, Total
(Source: World Bank)
37 
population. Using the example of Syria’s water security failures as a potential outcome 
for Iran’s current course highlights the importance of investigating models linking Syria’s 
outcomes onto Iran.  
Models 
The available research has and continues to stress the importance and critical 
requirement to address water security, yet a methodology to model its interaction with 
influencers is absent. Many researchers understand that water security involves 
monitoring more than surface, ground, and transboundary water sources [23], [29], [34]. 
Currently, scientific models of linkages between water securities, migration, and conflict 
are unavailable. Hydrological models of the world such as WaterGAP provide the UN 
and other international assessors do exist with freshwater flow and storages statistics. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN maintains AQUASTAT, a 
collection of analyzed water resource, use, and agricultural management data for all 
countries [3]. The World Bank has an extensive database of fragility and conflict meta- 
and micro-data for numerous countries [54]. The aforementioned resources possess 
potentially applicable models for water security analysis, particularly Simonovic’s 
WorldWater model and Zarghami’s Tabriz Systems Dynamics model [4], [51].  
Migration  
 The International Organization of Migration (IOM), the UN migration agency, 
defined migration as 
The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international 
border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of 
movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes 
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migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving 
for other purposes, including family reunification [55].  
 The number of migrants in 2017, including refugees and internally displaced 
persons, topped 258 million, or three percent of the world’s population [56]. According to 
the World Bank’s 2016 Migration and Remittance Report, migrant numbers have risen in 
recent years due to job opportunities, labor shortages resulting from falling birth rates, 
internal conflict and war, natural disasters, climate change, and improved access to 
information through phone and the Internet [46].  
 While there are many apparent causes of migration, there are also a variety of 
theories postulating its drivers. Beginning with Ernst Georg Ravenstein’s seminal work in 
the 1880’s, migration theories progressed throughout the 20th century through works by 
Greenwood, Graves, and Lee. As a demographer, Lee provided a framework to describe 
migration volume, streams and counter streams, along with the characteristics of migrants 
[57]. He simply stated that migrants permanently or non-permanently move from one 
location to another. Those moves are characterized by attractiveness measured in ‘pluses 
and ‘minuses’ at the origin and destination separated by varying degrees of intervening 
obstacles. These moves occur on more broadly defined ‘push-pull’ networks between two 
or more locations, including transit locations between an origin and a destination. 
Migrants consider both rational and irrational reasons for moving from an unattractive 
origin to a perceived more attractive destination.  
The resulting volume of migrants causes streams and counter streams to and from 
the destination and origin, respectively. Positive and negative characteristics influence 
migration; migrants with higher intelligence or more education typically make rational 
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and positive decisions based on their assessment of pluses at the destination. Positively 
inclined migrants can maneuver through and overcome the intervening obstacles in the 
migration process. The opposite is true for those migrants negatively associated with the 
minuses in the origin. Lee provided a similar conclusion by stating that incorporating 
personal characteristics of migrants in the form of micro-data may be influential towards 
advancing empirical research in migration including dynamic models of migratory 
behavior using time-series data [57, p. 541].  
 While micro-data is unavailable for one of the more major and recent migrations 
caused by water scarcity in Syria, exploring the larger drivers is necessary. Syria 
experienced a significant drought from 2004-2011 that resulted in the unemployment and 
eventual migration of 1.5 million people from rural agriculture populations into the urban 
areas. Although Syrians endured a civil war with a government capable of supplying 50 
percent of them access to clean water, the infrastructure and supply were being 
weaponized by Islamic State (IS) terrorists in attempts to incentivize recruitment and 
control. Other catalysts fired the migration and reinforced the subsequent civil war. Water 
scarcity forced farmers and herders from their homes in the country side into the cities 
and urban areas looking for better livelihoods and resources. But the cities were already 
taxed beyond capacity in terms of water, which placed demands on the government to 
deliver increased water supply and other resources. Keep in mind that Syria’s population 
had experienced major growth—from 3 million in 1950 to 22 million in 2012. The 
reformed government failed to provide additional water supply, which preceded violent 
uprisings against the government. The primary demand of those leading many uprisings 
was not for reform but for water [58, p. 14].  
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 Edwards offered a more in-depth analysis of migrant behavior in attempts to 
model the complexities of forced migration, particularly the reasoning behind why micro 
and macro level inputs, along with push-pull and migratory networks insufficiently 
explain the subject [16]. With extensive support for his analysis, he stated there are two 
primary types of migrants: those who move for economic reasons and those who are 
forced to migrate due to other reasons. Other studies have emulated these results [59]–
[61] . Typically, forced migration is said to be the result of some crisis or combination of 
crises whereas voluntary migration is by choice and is therefore rationalized by the 
decision maker. Edwards focused on what is lost to many migration and refugee flow 
studies; the choices of those migrants within the migration framework. While there is 
merit to the push-pull methodology as it links the micro (individual) and macro 
(structural inputs) level causes, studies and research largely omit the meso (social) level 
that Edwards investigated [16]. 
  Refugees experiencing forced migration are subject to social drivers unlike those 
in voluntary or economic migrants. Drivers are usually apparent or reported by voluntary 
migrants in a push-pull model whereas the drivers in a forced migration are far more 
obscure. Refugees are driven by complexities and variances in their environment, 
especially those social networks that determine migratory networks that must be 
acknowledged before becoming a crisis. Edwards pointed out that the UNHCR identifies 
potential signs of migration that include ethnic, racial, social, or religious tensions, 
human rights violations, opposing political movements, faulty relationships with 
neighboring countries, demographics, environmental issues, economic instability, drug 
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trafficking and historical evidence within their contingency planning guidelines for their 
field staff [16, p. 22].  
 Over time, studies have accumulated on the drivers of different forms of 
migration. Violence, especially armed conflict sponsored by government militaries 
causes displacement (IDPs) and refugee outflow [59], [60]. States not protecting the 
human rights of their population cause more refugees [62]. Poverty stricken populations 
as a result of economic depravation increase displacement as well [60], [63]. These 
drivers have been postulated in studies of early warning models of potential humanitarian 
disasters resulting in migration [64]. Migratory causes are extensive but nevertheless 
include a population’s dependency on resources, and when water becomes scarce, people 
will relocate. Water security and water scarcity are both integrated into migration in 
many direct and indirect aspects. Data sets originating from experiments, observations 
over time, and modeled simulations vary in terms of density and fidelity. These facts 
support the primary issue of water scarcity in this study. 
Conflict 
 There are a range of definitions for conflict applicable to the topic at hand. From a 
civilian perspective, Maurer defined conflict as a “disagreement resulting from 
incompatible demands between or among two or more parties [65, p. 1].” NATO defined 
the term as a 
political-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by 
the introduction of organized political violence and from war by its reliance on 
political methods. It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including 
the destruction of governments and the control of territory [66].  
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Interestingly, the US Department of Defense official dictionary [67] had no definition for 
conflict, but offered supporting terminology of a similar context. They defined the term 
engagement as “a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver 
forces [67].” The DoD officially defines conflict prevention as a  
peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when 
necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the cause of conflict, and take 
timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities 
[67].”  
References to conflict within DoD joint publications usually accompanied the term 
“armed” or “continuum.” Conflict continuum is a “measure of military instrument of 
national power applied between the states of peace and war [68, p. 119].” The definitions 
vary based on political, organizational, and individual involvement along with the level 
and intensity of violence occurring. With respect to this research, the more important 
aspect of conflict are the causes. 
 Stewart [17] presented cultural and economic drivers to wars and conflict that 
include ethnic, religious, economic, and social causes. The author briefly described four 
interrelated economic hypotheses supported by evidence from analyses of countries 
exhibiting conflict or war. Economics plays a fundamental rather than supplementary role 
in each hypothesis. In the first, the author states groups may exhibit cultural or religious 
differences, but conflict is not realized until political or economic power is imbalanced 
[17]. The second hypothesis states that personal gain is realized during war and conflict 
when largely uneducated young men become attracted to more lucrative opportunities, 
regardless of the morality, when socially accepted employment options are minimal or 
nonexistent. In the third hypothesis, when the unwritten socially acceptable balance 
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between a population and the government fails, it is typically due to the populations lack 
of faith in the government’s commitment to provide basic needs. Finally, when the 
environment ceases to sustain the population, such as a water scarcity, the population 
suffers. A particular resource scarcity may be caused by a lack of governance or policy in 
management, sustainability, disaster preparedness and response, and infrastructure.  
The hypotheses presented by Stewart are supported by evidence in the form of 
analyses and studies across numerous populations. Group inequality occurs within a 
population in the form of horizontal inequalities, which when they become widespread 
and persist, can cause a range of conflict from protests to rebellions. When groups are 
unable or unwilling to consider peaceful negotiations, especially if their government has 
failed to address inequalities, conflict can occur. Horizontal inequalities occur when 
groups, not individuals, share common identities but differ in social, economic, political, 
and cultural statuses and is largely measured in terms of income or consumption [18]. 
One study supports the theory that personal gain in the form of greed outweighs 
grievance between a populace and their governments although the methodologies of the 
study are contentious [69].  
Other evidence regarding econometrics and environments indicated significant 
variances. These variances existed when per capita incomes, life expectancy, and 
economic growth figures were analyzed when determining vertical separation and 
conflict. Countries vulnerable to conflict typically do not receive support from outside 
funding, especially when their governments are failing. In terms of environments, 
particularly resources, there are disparities between scarcity and abundance. Scarcity 
tends to cause conflict from the populace given inadequate resources whereas abundance 
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is fortuitous to groups willing and able to seize control. As mentioned, these hypotheses 
are not mutually exclusive, and result in horizontal inequalities driving conflict such as 
those listed in Table 4. Causes of conflict presented by Stewart [17] require further 
investigation of horizontal inequalities in countries where populations are suffering from 
imbalanced governments and unfair policies that favor particular groups, empower 
corruption, devalue education, and misuse resources.  
Table 4: Horizontal Inequality (HI) Examples 
 
One of the primary underlying drivers to the majority of conflict is a propensity 
for conflict within a country’s history. Østby’s empirical and spatial analysis across Sub-
Saharan African countries, for 1986–2003, reveals a significant rise in the probability of 
conflict in countries with severe economic and social HIs [70]. Specifically, these HIs 
include low educational levels along with high levels of intra-regional socioeconomic 
inequalities influence higher levels of conflict [70]. Østby cites that abundant natural 
(Source: Stewart) 
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resources cause conflict due to deprivation levels. Other statistical research supporting 
this relationship includes relative deprivation and conflict in Sub-Saharan African 
countries in the 1960s [71], [72]. Data from 1946–2005 for the world indicates that 
countries exhibiting political exclusion of populations experience more violence [73].  
Countries with high value natural resources are potentially susceptible to conflict, 
especially when the level of scarcity changes drastically [18]. Across groups of people, 
unbalanced quantities or access create opportunities for powerful groups to control a 
perceived inferior group. While Stewart cites oil and diamonds as valuable natural 
resource, water has the potential to incite significant HIs if an abundant water resource 
falls under the control of a corrupt or violent group. Governments have the ability to 
enact policy limiting resource infrastructure to poorer or impoverished populations in 
efforts to reform or force them to migrate.  
O’Brien presented a fuzzy algorithm application approach to forecasting conflict 
using social, economic, and political variables such as GDP per capita, number of civil 
liberties, and ratio of young-to-old [74]. His results indicated an 80 percent success of 
predicting conflict from data used to categorically rank conflicts. O’Brien recommended 
a collaborative social science experiment where a repository of interdisciplinary efforts 
could be submitted, recorded, incorporated, and analyzed [75]. This large-scale project 
aimed to aggregate social, economic, political, cultural, and military drivers of conflict 
based on the extensive studies and research of past and present in order to increase the 
collective knowledge for future conflict research.  
There are significantly more studies and research about conflict than water 
security and migration. The key aspect of the reviewed literature is that water as a natural 
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resource with the potential to influence conflict. People intuitively seek out water as a 
necessity for life, and in water scarce and insecure countries many often migrate to do so. 
Yet as the literature has suggested, engaging in conflict over water resources may be a 
choice motivated by one or several known or unknown contributing drivers. As with 
migration, exploring the causes of conflict is necessary towards understanding the 
potential influence water resources can exercise.  
System Dynamics 
System dynamics is a methodology applicable to modeling factors of a 
convoluted system of interdependent factors such as the one presented in this thesis. Jay 
Forrester developed system dynamics following his work with management at General 
Electric and with radar systems for the US Navy. He blended the complexities of social 
systems with physical systems at the recently established School of Management at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT [76]. Forrester describes systems as “a 
grouping of parts that operate together for a common purpose” [77].  The DoD operates 
in a hierarchical manner with information and knowledge controlled by classification and 
necessity.  Relatedly, Forrester informs that “without an organizing structure, knowledge 
is a mere collection of observations, practices and conflicting incidents” [77].  To arrive 
at solutions for strategic and operational planning efforts, systems that define the 
intricacies and relationships within the operational environment are necessary.   
 System dynamics, stated simply, attempts to model the interdependent elements 
within a system in order to understand its behavior over time [4], [5], [78]. That behavior 
is characterized by the complexity of the system’s elements, and the accuracy of the 
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behavior is dependent on proper system modeling. A system dynamics model is 
comprised of causal loops identifying the feedback of interactions between elements of a 
system. These causal loops are typically converted to ‘stocks’ and ‘flows’. Stocks 
represent an element with a capacity that can change over time whereas a flow is the rate 
at which a stock can change. Stock and flow diagrams display the interactions between 
elements in the system so information can be traced throughout. Linear and/or continuous 
equations in time are applied to the system flows before initializing the system with 
appropriate stock levels based on expert input, previous research, or analyses [79].  
The dynamic nature of an operational environment demands the analysis and 
planning to which the DoD currently subscribes in addition to a number of system 
dynamics methods introduced over the last fifty years.  An operational environment is a 
complex system to model.  Forrester progressed his work in system dynamics by 
publishing a provocative urban model highlighting the negative effects of inner city 
housing projects [76], [80]. He continued his non-corporate work on the WORLD models 
after an invitation to the Club of Rome led to development of a world socioeconomic 
model [81].  
 Forrester continued refining and applying system dynamics methodologies to the 
US economy and education while other researchers developed models for other 
applications. These included energy and in particular, gas, coal, oil, and electricity 
utilities [76]. More pertinent to the research supporting this thesis, system dynamics has 
been applied to hydrology and water scarcity issues in particular regions of the world. 
Elshorbagy described methodologies for teaching watershed hydrology, which is a 
natural renewable water source where precipitation and snow melt is collected and 
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channeled on or in the ground towards an outlet [5, p. 1203]. The watershed models 
created by Elshorbagy are one application of system dynamics applicable to this research. 
Other than watersheds, system dynamics models approximating world parameters have 
notable applicability. Kojiri, Hori, Nakatsuka, and Chong assessed future water scarcity 
on population growth for each continent using six societal sectors [6]. These sectors 
included population (birth, maturation and death), agriculture (land development, land 
fertility, food production); capital (industrial and service outputs), nonrenewable 
resources (resources use and extraction), persistent pollution (pollution emission and 
assimilation) and water (water quality and water quantity) interacting with migration, 
trade of food, nonrenewable resources and industrial outputs, and foreign investments of 
services [6].  
Simonovic produced a similar model, WorldWater, using the existing World3 
model. The World3 model is dynamic versus many other water resource models (Table 5) 
whose applicability to world development Simonovic felt was limited [4, p. 250]. 
Table 5: Water Models 
Available Water Models 
Policy Dialogue Model (PODIUM) 
International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural 
Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) 
POLESTAR 
Water Evaluation and Planning System (WEAP) 
Water Global Assessment and Prognosis (WATERGAP) 
Tool to Assess Regional and Global Environment and health 
Targets for Sustainability (TARGETS) 
(Source: Simonovic) 
Simonovic concludes that developing regional models of the WorldWater model would 
be far more effective in understanding dynamic regional water issues rather than 
attempting to convey water issues from a global standpoint. In a working paper on the 
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topic of global water by Gassert, Landis, Luck, Reig, and Shiao, hydrological information 
is presented through a composite index approach [82]. Gassert et al. attempted to enable 
decision makers with water related risk indicators across the world, but cautioned this 
type of methodology was not advised for site or regional applications. These are 
important aspects for the research in this thesis since determining the affect water scarcity 
has on a local rather than global population towards migration or conflict is far more 
specific.  
 System dynamics is an ideal methodology to be applied to a dynamic environment 
with a multitude of potentially applicable dependent and independent variables. This 
overview of literature concerning system dynamics and pertinent research enables this 
study to model select water security variables with the intent of investigating the 
influence on migration and conflict.  
Model Validation 
 Generally, modelers understand that their models are an abstraction of the truth, 
but that their perspective ultimately fails to address the truth entirely. The usefulness of a 
model is largely dependent on the modeler’s ability to convey the practicality in its 
purpose whether that is to highlight previously accepted assumptions, challenge 
preconceived notions, or solicit input from varying disciplines.  Forrester defined 
validation as  
a process of establishing confidence in the soundness and usefulness of a 
model…beginning as the model builder accumulates confidence that a model 
behaves plausibly and generates problem symptoms or modes of behavior seen in 
the real system [83, p. 210].  
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Sterman recited the fundamental definitions of verification and validation as examples of 
the fact that it is impossible to truly prove a model’s worth since it is wrong [79, p. 846]. 
Zagonel consolidated validation and verification processes for both Forrester and Senge, 
and Sterman into five components each with ranked tests that avoid a “check-list” 
structure such that is commensurate with the modeling effort itself (Table 6).   
Table 6: Five Components of Modeling Practice 
 
Considering this study, our validation and verification efforts begin with mapping 
the topics of interest: water security, migration, and conflict. The narrative described 
within this chapter has led us towards a qualitative relationship between the variables to 
be investigated in our model. These social and environmental parameters include 
population (birth rate, death rate, and migration rate) and water balance (total internal and 
external renewable water resources, current per capita water consumption, water demand, 
and estimated change in migration rate). This study performs quantitative modeling using 
Vensim ® DSS [84], which permits stock and flow diagram formulation and simulation. 
(Source: Zagonel) 
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Our study proposes four questions for investigation: 
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized 
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas? 
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify a particular country’s water 
security? 
3. Does the amount of available renewable water resources per capita serve as a 
trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within a country? 
The third question is supported by the modeling and simulation efforts in Vensim while 
the remaining questions are based on qualitative deduction. The dynamics between 
parameters in the model is investigated over time through simulation. The simulations are 
varied by exercising the limits of particular parameters in order to determine their 
sensitivity. Finally simulation enables prediction across the model parameters in order to 
demonstrate behavior. Within the next chapter of this study, the validation processes are 
specifically defined. 
Summary 
The literature on relationships between water security, migration, and conflict 
humbly spans decades. While system dynamics has the most recent genesis in the mid-
20th century by Forrester, migration research has its roots within the 19th century by the 
early work of Ravenstein. Even more incredible is that water security has been directly 
and indirectly strategized for several millennia by powers who have risen and fallen. The 
literature reviewed in this chapter supports the preceding investigation of drivers of water 
security and migration.  
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes the model building process, including the course of action 
required to define the causal relationships between water security and migration. Data 
required to parameterize the stock and flow system dynamic model is identified. Several 
verification and validation processes are executed in order to ensure sufficient accuracy 
for the simulation. A design of experiments is created and implemented to identify the 
extent of the drivers (parameters). Several scenarios are executed in Chapter 4 to 
investigate the overall influence of the drivers in Iran. 
Model Purpose 
As previously discussed, there are several narratives claiming that interdependent 
social, economic, political, and environmental factors drive water scarcity, migration, and 
conflict. The model defined in this chapter focuses on the total per capita renewable 
water resource availability, and the migration rate of change to address the following 
questions:  
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized 
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas? 
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify Iran’s water security? 
3. Does the amount of per capita renewable water resources available serve as a 
trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within Iran? 
The first question is rhetorical, since we have identified total per capita renewable water 
resource consumption and availability (TRWR-C and TRWR-A, respectively), and the 
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migration rate of change as potential drivers. It is important to investigate the relationship 
between TRWR-A and migration, since they are separate observations with various data 
sources. Finally, investigating TRWR-A may or may not indicate a difference between 
actual or perceived influence, or whether it is a direct or indirect driver of migration.  
Data Requirements 
Many data sources were reviewed for possible application as social, economic, 
political, and environmental drivers. Those database sources considered for inclusion 
included: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) AQUASTAT website [3], 
World Development Indicators from the World Bank DataBank website [85], the US 
Census Bureau, International Division [86], and the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees [87]. Several other water resource data sources referencing AQUASTAT data 
were excluded due to lack of value added from the aforementioned data sources.  
It is noteworthy that the aggregated AQUASTAT data utilized for this study, 
particularly the TRWR-A is based on long-term averages of known internal and external 
sources. The AQUASTAT database was aggregated by country, rather than by region. 
All TRWR-A observations occurred every five years beginning in 1962 and ending in 
2014. Consequently, if the observation data was unchanged throughout the range, those 
calculated data utilized the long-term average. This fact is problematic since other 
sources cite different annual water resource observations from regional municipal, 
industrial, or agricultural sources. However, no available regional sources possessed 
time-series data covering the period AQUASTAT offered. The World Development 
Indicators database offered on the World Bank DataBank website contained several 
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observation series from the AQUASTAT database. The World Bank database was 
queried by country along with 1,574 estimated ‘indicators’ relevant to global, national, 
and regional development [85]. The input parameters and model variables and 
corresponding data sources are listed in Table 7. Migration and death figures are not 
delineated by cause and are assumed to encompass all causes including water scarcity 
and conflict-related deaths.  
There were other studies regarding drivers and causes water scarcity and 
insecurity available that were also considered as data sources. As previously mentioned, 
GRACE and observed Iranian well level data analyzed by Joodaki et al. resulted in 
significant decreases in groundwater storage due to both climate and anthropogenic 
influence [44], [45]. Rainfall, drought, and agricultural studies offered total renewable 
water resource data as well [33], [88], [89]. Observations direct from Iranian water 
resource managers was publicly available, but access restricted offered the best potential 
water resource and consumption data [45]. News outlets offered sparse estimated annual 
water resource levels and consumption rates from independent and government sources 
[41], [50], [90], [91]. The reputation of the UN and the vast number of citations for other 
water scarcity and security researchers solidified the decision to utilize AQUASTAT 
estimates in this thesis. The case for migration rates and data was taken in the same 
regard. More independent researchers, aid organizations, and governments referenced the 
UN Refugee database than any other source. Of course, as better data sources become 
available, they can be utilized. 
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Model Construction 
 The causal model and stock and flow diagram developed for this study is an 
adaptation Simonovic’s WorldWater (Figure 10) model along with s-shaped limits to 
growth feedback systems found in several texts [77], [79], [81], [92]. The primary focus 
is population, since total renewable water resources per capita (TRWR-P) is the quotient 
of TRWR-A and population. The causal loop diagram in Figure 11 denotes this focus. 
Population has a positive influence on consumption, which has a negative influence on 
water resources.  
 
Figure 10: WorldWater Model  
 
Since water resources are the limit to growth in this model, they negatively influence 
population as they decrease, thus positively influencing migration (emigration). 
(Source: Simonovic, 2002 p. 256) 
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Migration is typically denoted as net migration, which is the net change of migration 
from both emigration and immigration. We are concerned with emigration due to the 
historically observed examples of populations migrating towards abundant resources or 
away from areas lacking resources.  
 
Figure 11: Causal Loop Diagram of Model 
 There are many parameters and variables influencing population. The parameters 
and variables used in this study’s model are described in Table 7. The exogenous 
parameters we utilized in the model include average lifetime (years), birth, death, and net 
migration rates (approximated as number per 1000 people), and the initial population. 
Specific to modeling limits to growth models, a carrying capacity is introduced to balance 
the reinforcing growth loop from births through migration and deaths. The carrying 
capacity is defined as the quotient of TRWR-A divided by the TRWR-P (above 95 
percent consumed, TRWR-C/TRWR-A) giving a population (persons).  
 We hypothesize migration and death rates of change increase as TRWR-P 
decreases. These rates of change are modeled through both UN FAO AQUASTAT and 
57 
US Census Bureau migration and birth rate data beginning from the point in time (years) 
when TRWR-C is 95 percent or greater than TRWR-A. In the case of Syria, TRWR-C 
was over 95 percent of TRWR-A in the year 2001 according to UN FAO AQUASTAT 
estimates [3]. Migration and death rates are modeled and parameterized as lookup tables 
with percentages of normalized population (population divided by carrying capacity) as 
input and the gross migration and death rates as outputs. Lookup table outputs are input 
as a multiplier of the normal migration and death rates, respectively. Migration and death 
rates are integrated over time along with the population as feedback. Since the effects of 
TRWR-P are not instantaneous on a population, migration and death rates have 
exponential smoothing factors with corresponding delays (years). Delays are varied 
depending on the model’s response (population level, in persons). The UN World 
Population Prospects 2017 projected that 40 per cent of Syrian refugees return in 2020-
2025, 30 per cent in 2025-2030 and 10 per cent in 2030-2035 [93].   
 
Figure 12: Model 
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Table 7: Model Parameters and Variables 
Parameter / 
Variable 
Description Data Source Input /  
Model 
Population Number of persons given births, deaths, and 
emigrants over time (persons) 
WDI, US Census Model 
Initial Population Number of persons at simulation start time (year) WDI, US Census Input 
Carrying Capacity Quotient of TRWR-A and TRWR-P (at 95% 
consumption of TRWR-A) (persons) 
AQUASTAT Input 
Normalized 
Population 
Fraction of Population and Carrying Capacity 
(percent) 
- Input 
Births Quantity of births (person) - Model 
Birth Rate Fraction of births occurring per 1000 persons per 
year (fraction / year) 
WDI, US Census Input 
Average Lifetime Life expectancy at birth (years) WDI, US Census Input 
Deaths Quantity of deaths (person) - Model 
Normal Death Rate Fraction of deaths occurring per 1000 persons per 
year (fraction / year) 
WDI, US Census Input 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Deaths 
Product of Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths 
Function and Normalized Population 
(Dimensionless) 
- Model 
Effect Delay on 
Deaths 
Parameter of exponential delay (years) WDI, US Census Model 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Deaths Function 
Table of inputs of Normalized Population 
corresponding to crude deaths (Dimensionless) 
WDI, US Census Input 
Migration Product of Normal migration rate and Effect of 
TRWR-P on migration  
WDI, US Census Model 
Normal Migration 
Rate 
Product of Emigrants and Population (persons) WDI, US Census Model 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Migration 
Product of Effect of TRWR-P on Migration 
Function and Normalized Population 
(Dimensionless) 
- Model 
Effect Delay on 
Migration 
Parameter of exponential delay (years) WDI, US Census Input 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Migration 
Function 
Table of inputs of Normalized Population 
corresponding to crude migration 
(Dimensionless) 
WDI, US Census Input 
Emigration Rate Fraction of emigrants per 1000 persons per year 
(fraction / year) 
WDI, US Census Input 
 
Training Model Initialization 
  The model is initialized using Syria data as the training set in order to determine 
performance, verify, and validate the model for the test set (Iran). All initialization data is 
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sourced from US Census Bureau, UN FAO AQUASTAT. Simulation time begins in the 
year 2001 and ends in 2025, with recorded Syrian population, migration, births, and 
deaths from 2001 to present, and forecasted data from 2018 to 2025. Initialization values 
are defined in Table 8. 
Table 8: Syria Model Initialization Values 
Parameter  Description Starting Value (Year) 
Initial Population Number of persons at simulation start time (year) 16.93 million (2001) 
Carrying Capacity Quotient of TRWR-A and TRWR-P:  
(16.8 billion cu. meters / 825 cu. Meters) 
20.63 million 
Birth Rate Fraction of births occurring per 1000 persons per 
year (fraction / year) 
30 (2001) 
Average Lifetime Life expectancy at birth (years) 72 
Normal Death Rate Fraction of deaths occurring per 1000 persons per 
year (fraction / year) 
4 
Effect Delay on 
Deaths 
Parameter of exponential delay (years) 2.7 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Deaths Function 
Table of inputs of Normalized Population 
corresponding to crude deaths (Dimensionless) 
(1,0), (1.01,47), 
(1.02,147), (1.03,114), 
(1.04,20), (1.05,1) 
Emigration Rate Fraction of emigrants per 1000 persons per year 
(fraction / year) 
0.1 
Effect Delay on 
Migration 
Parameter of exponential delay (years) 2.1 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Migration 
Function 
Table of inputs of Normalized Population 
corresponding to crude migration (Dimensionless) 
(1,0), (1.01,1.15), 
(1.02,1.3), (1.03,1.45), 
(1.04,1.6), (1.05,1.75) 
Model Verification 
 Recognizing that system dynamics models behave differently than discrete event 
simulation, Sterman stated that both model verification and validation of a system 
dynamics model are impossible based on existing traditional definitions of the terms [79, 
p. 846]. This statement is meant to enable thorough and robust model building rather than 
dissuade modelers from even attempting to produce a realistic perspective. The purpose 
of the model in this study is to investigate the applicability of TRWR-P as a driver of 
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migration and/or conflict within a country. Model verification is implemented by 
inputting Syrian migration, birth, death, and TRWR-P data and comparing the model’s 
output to Syrian population over the same time period. The model is validated using 
several of Forrester and Senge’s validation tests adapted and redefined by Zagonel [83], 
[94].  
 The US Census Bureau provided Syrian migration rate using UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data from 2001 through 2013 and estimated data 
through 2025 (Figure 13). The simulation begins at 2001 since net migration prior to that 
year had a mean of -1.05 (1981-2000), which implies an approximately steady state rate. 
2001 is also the period of time when TRWR-C rose above 95 percent of TRWR-A. 
Including migration data from 2001 to 2005 prior to the beginning of the drought in 2004 
enables simulation and visualization of a steady state migration preceding the significant 
decrease through 2013.  
 
Figure 13: US Census Bureau Migration Data for Syria 
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Using estimated migration data following 2013 enables the simulation of a stabilizing 
population following the significant migration. Immigration rates occurring from 2005-
2007 are omitted in the simulation due to the fact that sources defining the cause were 
unavailable. The migration rates were included as outputs of the lookup function Effect 
of TRWR-P on Migration Function with the Normalized Population values as inputs. The 
window of migration rates are reduced from 2006-2013 to 2012-2015 to prevent the 
effect on exponential delay in the migration rate and influencing the population level. The 
Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths Function is established with a simpler ramp function in 
order to replicate the change in death rates from 4 to 7 per 1000 from 2011-2012. Death 
rates provided by the World Bank sourced from UN World Population Prospects were 
estimated to the nearest thousandth, and were used in the Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths 
Function along with the Normalized Population values as inputs.  
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Figure 14: Effects of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions 
Using standard least squares regression, the simulated model fit the actual population 
data (2001-2016) with a 𝐼𝐼2 = 0.94 with a 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2 = 0.93 indicating 94 percent of the 
variability in the strength is accounted for by the model (Figure 15, Figure 16). Adding 
the additional estimated data (2017-2025) from the US Census Bureau to the model 
results in a 𝐼𝐼2 = 0.42 with a 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2 = 0.40 (Figure 17, Figure 18). The addition of the 
estimated US Census Bureau data (2017-2025) reduced the strength of the model 
according to standard least squares regression. However, the model displays a strong 
variability for actual Syrian population data providing a starting point from which to 
(Source: Ventana) 
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predict population changes based on net migration, birth, and death rates. In addition, 
while the 𝐼𝐼2 = 0.42 would not be considered high for engineering data, it is respectable 
for behavioral data. 
 
Figure 15: Model Verification of Population  
 
Figure 16: Predicted Fit of Simulated to Actual Population Data 
0
5000000
10000000
15000000
20000000
25000000
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Year
Verification: Actual to Simulated
Population, Actual (WDI) Population, Simulated
64 
 
Figure 17: Model Verification of Population (with est. data) 
 
Figure 18: Predicted Fit of Simulated to Actual Population Data (with est. data) 
Model Validation 
 Five tests adapted by Zagonel’s reorganization of Forrester and Senge’s validation 
tests provided in Appendix A are performed [83], [94]. The tests cover three of the five 
components including quantitative, hypothesis, and uncertainty. These tests are selected 
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due to their ‘basic’ categorization within the five component organization and their 
applicability on the simplistic design of the model. 
The first test determines physical conservation—does the model adhere to real-
world conditions in Syria? The model outputs population levels by simulating actual rate 
data retrieved from credible sources (UN, World Bank) with methodologies 
commensurate with accepted population definitions [10], [12], [87].  The second test 
determines the dimensional consistency within the model—are all parameters, variables, 
levels, and rates realistic for Syria? All dimensions are appropriately and accurately 
applied within the model. The dimensionless parameters in the model are fractions of 
known dimensions and do not inappropriately dimension other parameters or variables. 
The third test determines the qualitative behavior—does the model simulate the real-
world response? The model demonstrates expected behavior determined by the 
availability of actual population data. However, the model does not respond in an 
expected manner with estimated data, particularly US Census Bureau population from 
2017-2025. The lack of actual census data, variability of water security and conflict in the 
modeled country (Syria), and unknown outcome of current events in the modeled country 
limit modeling accuracy for future time periods. 
The fourth test determines whether TRWR-P is endogenous—does limiting the 
population drive migration based on TRWR-P levels? Normalizing the population in 
order to affect the migration and death rates is accurately represented by the simulated 
response and verified through standard least squares regression. The fifth test determines 
the model sensitivity—do values change significantly when parameters are varied over 
plausible ranges? Dimensionless parameters represent observed rates of change and 
66 
therefore are not included in this test. The model appears sensitive to migration, birth, 
and death rates. The five tests offer validity to the model in this study based on the 
complexity, application, and available parameters. 
Model Demonstration 
 The proposed model and parameters appear to realistically represent what 
occurred in Syria adding credibility to the overall framework. The model is exercised 
through a demonstration in order to determine if the observed differences in the factors 
are due to changes only and if the observed differences are statistically significant [95]. 
The factors in the demonstration include levels of the Effect Delay on Migration, Effect 
Delay on Deaths parameters, and Carrying Capacity (correlated to TRWR-P). The 
treatment levels are defined in Table 9. 
Table 9: Treatment Levels 
Factor Level 
Effect Delay on Migration 1-10 years 
Effect Delay on Deaths 1-10 years 
Carrying Capacity 72.20 – 91.10 million 
 
As of 2007, the Iranian population was 72,203,000 people, with a TRWR-A of 
137 billion cubic meters (TRWR-P of 1910 m3/person/year), and a consumption of 68.1 
percent (TRWR-C of 1301 m3/person/year). The consumption rate of change increased an 
average of 3.76 percent from 1997 to 2007. A level of 95 percent consumption of 
TRWR-A is reached in the year 2047 by extrapolating the consumption rate of change. 
The population in the year 2047 is estimated to be 85,694,055 by extrapolating the 2014 
population using the proposed 1.3 percent annual growth rate. In the year 2047, Iranian 
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TRWR-P is an estimated 1582 m3/person/year. Simulation of the model with Iranian data 
begins in the year 2007, since this marks the last available observed consumption of 
TRWR-A data. The Effect of TRWR-P on Deaths Function and Effect of TRWR-P on 
Migration Function are maintained from the Syrian model and Effect Delays on 
Migration and Deaths are initialized at 1 year. The range of delay is selected based on 
assumed ranges of response time to both water scarcity and conflict as well as the 
limitations of the exponential delay function within the software. Delay values below 1 
resulted in oscillation of all variables, thus a lower bound of 1 was established. Model 
initialization values for Iran are located in Table 11. The model is also simulated at 
optimal Effect Delay on Migration and Effect Delay on Deaths for Syria with Carrying 
Capacity at 86.6 million people. Finally, the model is optimized using Vensim software. 
Simulation occurs over the 2007-2032 time period in order to maintain the same time 
period as the Syrian simulation, but adjusted to the right in order to capture the most 
recent TRWR-C value (2007). Simulation scenarios are listed in Table 10.  
Model Tuning 
  The model is “optimized” using the Vensim Optimizer function by weighting the 
specified factor as the highest priority and tuning the remaining model parameters 
(factors) in Table 9. Tuning in the Vensim software maximizes the prioritized factor 
across the simulation period. The payoff value for tuning is population and migration; 
maximizing these factors across the period of simulation minimizes the balancing and 
reinforcing feedback endogenous to the model.  
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Summary 
 In this chapter, we developed a population simulation model using Syrian 
parameters and variables. The data required to simulate the model were identified, 
interpolated, and extrapolated only when necessary to satisfy simulation periods over 
estimated population responses. Using actual and estimated Syrian data, we verified the 
simulation model using standard regression techniques. The simulation model was 
validated through several known tests in an effort to most accurately represent population 
growth. A demonstration was designed to test the effects of various treatments on specific 
factors through four scenarios. Finally the scenarios were executed as a method to 
determine if the Iranian population (response) will follow the Syrian population given the 
same effects on migration and death functions and delays. 
Table 10: Simulation Scenarios. 
Scenario Effect Delay on Migration 
Effect Delay on 
Deaths 
Carrying 
Capacity 
Baseline 1 1 86.6 million 
Syria 2.1 2.7 86.6 million 
Vensim Opt. 
Population ? ? ? 
Vensim Opt. 
Migration ? ? ? 
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Table 11: Iranian Initialization Values 
Parameter  Description Starting Value (Year) 
Initial Population Number of persons at simulation start time (year) 72.20 million (2007) 
Carrying Capacity Quotient of TRWR-A and TRWR-P:  
(137 billion cu. meters / 1582 cu. Meters) 
86.60 million (est. 
2047) 
Birth Rate Fraction of births occurring per 1000 persons per 
year (fraction / year) 
18 
Average Lifetime Life expectancy at birth (years) 72 
Normal Death Rate Fraction of deaths occurring per 1000 persons per 
year (fraction / year) 
5 
Effect Delay on 
Deaths 
Parameter of exponential delay (years) 1 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Deaths Function 
Table of inputs of Normalized Population 
corresponding to crude deaths (Dimensionless) 
(1,0), (1.01,47), 
(1.02,147), (1.03,114), 
(1.04,20), (1.05,1) 
Emigration Rate Fraction of emigrants per 1000 persons per year 
(fraction / year) 
1 
Effect Delay on 
Migration 
Parameter of exponential delay (years) 1 
Effect of TRWR-P 
on Migration 
Function 
Table of inputs of Normalized Population 
corresponding to crude migration (Dimensionless) 
(1,0), (1.01,1.15), 
(1.02,1.3), (1.03,1.45), 
(1.04,1.6), (1.05,1.75) 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
The results of the model simulation include outputs for Population, Births, 
Deaths, and Migration across four scenarios presented in the previous chapter. We used 
the Vensim sensitivity analysis function to produce sensitivity graphs of each rate and 
level. The investigative questions is addressed separately based on the results of the 
simulation, when applicable, and the research conducted for this study.   
Results of Simulation Scenarios 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity was performed on Population, Births, Deaths, and Migration variables 
of the baseline Iran model based on the treatment levels in Table 9. Birth rate established 
the initial Population (Figure 19) growth increasing from 75 million to 89.4 million 
people before decreasing as a result of the Effect of TRWR-P on Migration and the Effect 
of TRWR-P on Deaths. The range of Population growth results from the limits of the 
Carrying Capacity. The uncertainty of Population increased over time and particularly 
following the increase in Migration and Deaths. This behavior is validated through the 
realistic uncertainty occurring after a major event such as a natural disaster or war.  
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Figure 19: Population Sensitivity Graph – Baseline 
Births (Figure 20) and Population shared the same sensitivity since Birth Rate reinforces 
the Population through feedback. Births followed the same uncertainty as Population 
because Births was the only reinforcing feedback in the model. Realistically, birth rates 
do fluctuate in a population experiencing a major event, particularly when health care is 
limited as a regulator of disease. Birth rates can also be affected by malnourishment if 
food and water supplies are restricted or contaminated.  
 
Figure 20: Births Sensitivity Graph – Baseline 
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The variable Deaths (Figure 21) increased sensitivity as a result of Effect of TRWR-P on 
Deaths and Effect of TRWR-P on Migration. Lower values (years) of Effect of TRWR-P 
on Deaths and Effect of TRWR-P on Migration allowed both Effect of TRWR-P on 
Deaths and Effect of TRWR-P on Migration Functions to maximize the reinforcing effect 
from Birth Rate on the population. The death rate of a population can vary for several 
reasons. Deaths are mainly attributed to life expectancy, but conflict and war can increase 
the death rate for those younger adult age categories, especially males. The uncertainty in 
Deaths from this simulation indicates significant variability within the 75 to 100 percent 
range.  
The variable Migration (Figure 22) exhibited similar sensitivity as Deaths, 
although the Migration values were higher due to the order of magnitude increases in the 
Effect of TRWR-P on Migration Function. The uncertainty of migration rates have been 
discussed considerably in this study and are largely due to improved livelihoods through 
increasing economic opportunities. The variability of uncertainty for Migration between 
75 and 100 percent appears lower than the variability in the same range for Deaths. 
However, the variability of Migration is clearly increased between 95 and 100 percent 
uncertainty compared to Deaths. The cause of increased variability in this particular 
range is unknown.  
The sensitivity of this model was determined largely through the parameters 
Effects Delay on Migration (and Deaths) that either shortened or lengthened the model’s 
response to the Effects of TRWR-P on Migration (and Deaths) Function. The length of 
each delay was essential to simulating the actual migration and death rates in the Syria 
and Iran model.  
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Figure 21: Deaths Sensitivity – Baseline 
 
 
Figure 22: Migration – Baseline 
   
Simulation Results 
 The results from simulating each of the four scenarios are shown in Figure 23, 
Figure 24, Figure 25, and Figure 26. The tuned factors for Vensim simulations are 
presented in Table 12. The baseline output (Figure 23) indicates a migration of 3.8 
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million and 0.5 million deaths from 2018 to 2019. Migration and deaths follow the Effect 
of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions with no delay. This outcome follows the 
delay of 1 year, as input, but does not adhere to the refugee return rate forecasted by the 
UN. The increase of Migration and Deaths at year 2031 indicate the Population level 
triggered the Effect of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions. This behavior may 
be desirable if the migration and death rates were to respond within a year of some 
underlying cause. However, the widely accepted S-shaped growth (or decay) curve is not 
evident, and therefore this population response is unrealistic.  
Table 12: Vensim Simulation Outcome – Factors 
Scenario Effect Delay on Migration 
Effect Delay on 
Deaths 
Carrying 
Capacity 
Vensim Opt. 
Population 1.87 10 86.6 million 
Vensim Opt. 
Migration 1 10 86.95 million 
 
 
Figure 23: Simulation Output – Baseline 
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 The simulation output using the Effect on Migration and Deaths Delays (2.1 and 
2.7 years, respectively) from the Syria validation model (Figure 24) resulted in a more 
realistic response according to the UN World Population Prospect 2017 refugee return 
rates. Again Carrying Capacity was set to 86.6 million, the estimated population of Iran 
when 95 percent of TRWR-A was consumed (in the year 2047). This study cannot 
assume the model’s exponential delay for Migration and Deaths include refugee returns 
considering available refugee return rates recorded by UNHCR sites include only those 
returnees who seek UN assistance as they return to their country of origin [87]. As 
previously mentioned, Migration and Deaths are all inclusive; separate subcategories for 
water and conflict related migrants and deaths were not modeled.   
 
 
Figure 24: Simulation Output – Syria Optimal 
 The simulation output using Vensim Optimization function (Figure 25) performed 
similarly to the model using the Syria validation model in terms of Migration and 
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Population levels. Since the software optimized Population, the Effect Delay on 
Migration (and Death) parameters were optimized. The software set Effect Delay on 
Migration to 1.87 years and Effect Delay on Deaths to 10 years. The Effect Delay on 
Deaths caused deaths to be distributed over a 10-year period, which is plausible given 
victimization from long-term conflict and/or contraction of water-borne viruses, but 
unlikely at such a constant rate. The uncertainty of Deaths shown in the sensitivity 
analysis in Figure 21 indicate there would be more variability in the number of deaths.  
  
 
Figure 25: Simulation Output – Population Opt. 
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Figure 26: Simulation Output – Migration Opt. 
 The simulation output using Vensim Optimization function (Figure 26) 
maximized Migration over time that resulted in a different Population response. 
Migration increased at a lower rate than for the Syrian Optimal or Population Opt. 
simulations, but resulted in a higher peak Migration. The software tuned the Effect Delay 
on Migration to one year, the Effect Delay on Deaths to 10 years, and the Carrying 
Capacity to 86.95 million persons. As mentioned previously with the Syrian Optimal 
simulation, the Effect Delay on Deaths set to 10 years is plausible, but unlikely.   
 Additionally, retaining the same carrying capacity over the simulation period 
resulted in “activating” the Effect of TRWR-P on Migration and Deaths Functions more 
than once. This translates to water resources remaining constant over time, which may or 
may not be accurate. Allowing this simulation behavior in the model, however, may 
identify other endogenous issues if migration and death rates were disaggregated or 
parameterized.  
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Investigative Questions Answered 
 The following were the questions posed at the beginning of this study in order to 
investigate the interdependencies between water security, migration, and conflict: 
1. What are the possible drivers of failing water security and can they be categorized 
within social, economic, political, and environmental areas? 
2. Do available water resource data sufficiently quantify Iran’s water security? 
3. Does the amount of per capita renewable water resources available (TRWR-P) 
serve as a trigger for potential migration and/or conflict within Iran? 
Question 1: Possible Drivers 
 This question was largely investigated through the literature review. Specific 
examples of social, economic, political, and environmental drivers in Syria and Iran were 
showcased. Socially, water has been a generally abundant resource to populations in the 
MENA region, and the people have a long history of controlling water resources through 
millennia-old technologies such as the qanat. This abundance has permitted cultures to 
endure long drought periods as well as devastating floods. However, as populations 
increase due to advanced technologies, improved hygiene and sanitation, and state health 
care, natural recharge rates decline resulting in increased demand on fuel. People, 
especially rural dwellers, have less resources to maintain their existing lifestyle and over 
time are led to make decisions to move. 
 Economically, populations are increasingly adapting to urban lifestyles as more 
people move towards cities. Increases in urban populations stress employment 
opportunities, infrastructure, and basic services for existing and transient people. As 
resources become stressed, the economy is stressed to keep pace with migrants and 
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internally displaced people. Politically, a government can exacerbate these stressors by 
applying untimely and inappropriate measures such as reducing or ending subsidies for 
essential services and resources such as fuel, fertilizer, or water. Frustrated, dissident 
groups may rise in power over limited resources in efforts to denounce government 
responses. Horizontal inequalities such as employment, education, land ownership, and 
basic services existing within groups may lead to protests, infighting, corruption, or 
conflict. Finally, the environment may suffer. Governments, especially those of low to 
middle class economies, which fail to manage or control resources may resort to more 
drastic solutions such as over abstraction of renewable groundwater, exploitation of fossil 
aquifers, and over damming to increase surface waters. Such solutions lead to 
biodiversity depletion through loss of green water, pollution of existing water sources, 
and eutrophication.  
 The sustainable goals set by the World Bank focus on governments’ 
accountability for water resource management, preparation for water-related risks, and 
capability of water delivery services. These goals are echoed through the numerous 
narratives, studies, and news articles supporting this study. Corrupt governments that 
mismanage resources due to a lack of expertise and observed data have been proven to 
fail to protect their populaces during droughts and floods. Similarly, those same 
governments struggle to maintain sufficient and quality water supplies via reliable 
infrastructure.  
 Question 2: Available Water Resource Data  
 Many MENA countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Qatar, and U.A.E. 
understand and have improved their water security. The increase use of desalination, 
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inter-basin water transfers, and groundwater monitoring are commonplace in such 
countries, which inherently enable the government to provide water through proper 
management. Regardless, countries such as Iran and especially Syria are experiencing the 
effects of water insecurity due to mismanagement and unsustainable practices. Water data 
have historically been estimated through measurement of surface flows, groundwater 
tables, precipitation, as well as all the watershed and water cycle variables provided. 
Many of these estimates are based on long-term averages of previous measurements of 
which the dates are unknown [3], [82].  
 The available water data used in this study included those long-term average data. 
Calculating the percentage of TRWR-A based on consumption was performed with four 
data points. All water data used was sourced from the UN’s AQUASTAT website, which 
was referenced by nearly all water research, except for those researchers fortunate to have 
direct measurement capability or access to the source. Denser data foster increased 
dependence and relevance for models than do sparse data. Iran possesses and offers 
regional water data for public use and research [96] and has been accessed and referenced 
by researchers [45]. The World Resource Institute leaned heavily on UN AQUASTAT 
data for their Aqueduct Global Maps 2.1 project to determine water risk indicators [82].  
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Research on water storage and usage is increasingly being conducted using data obtained 
through satellite observation as technologies become more accurate and precise. The 
GRACE project has continued to provide increasing levels of both accuracy and precision 
in order to deliver enhanced resolution groundwater storage products for analysis (Figure 
27). Improvements such as this are encouraging to researchers attempting to realistically 
model and predict and track natural seasonal variances and anthropogenic effects. 
Figure 27: Increase in GRACE Resolution 
 The data used in this study, particularly TRWR-A and TRWR-P fail to address 
Iran’s water security with a measurable degree of certainty. Modeling the water security 
in Syria required several key assumptions. The long-term average TRWR-A has not been 
affected by known reductions in rainfall quantities. Rainfall directly affects IRWR as 
precipitation is absorbed into the ground, infiltrating the alluvial flows, seeping into other 
water sources, evaporating into the atmosphere, or running off into waterways. The value 
of TRWR-A includes groundwater abstraction, which is typically measured through well 
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water withdrawals. Governments may or may not track every well, and attempts to 
license wells so as to monitor withdrawal rates are not reliable. Surface water flow in a 
country such as Iran which has a large quantity of dams for hydroelectric power 
generation and irrigation for agricultural purposes may or may not be affected, especially 
if transboundary surface flows upstream are dammed as well.  
Question 3: TRWR-P as a Potential Trigger  
 The total renewable water resources per capita available is a quotient of TRWR-A 
and the current population. As previously mentioned, TRWR-A is a long-term average. 
Population is an aggregated total of all TRWR users: agricultural, industrial, and 
municipal. UN AQUASTAT divides TRWR-A between agriculture, industrial, and 
municipal usages based on available observations, government or otherwise, and 
modelled estimations. UN AQUASTAT data is labeled with a variety of dates—many 
older than a decade. The infrequency of data updates is cause for concern when relying 
on this TRWR-P data as a potential trigger for migration and/or conflict. 
 TRWR-P could be a potential indicator if a well-defined lower bound were 
identified and accepted for an entire population or if TRWR-P were disaggregated to 
state or local users. The UN-defined range of water scarcity addresses populations with 
less than 1000 m3 per person annually (and absolute scarcity at 500 m3 per person 
annually) is without explanation. There is correlation with this definition and the 
estimated 825 m3 per person annually Syrians experienced in 2007 during a multi-year 
drought preceding civil war and mass migration. However, the proximity in time to the 
outbreak of conflict and migration in conjunction with the aggregated TRWR-P fail to 
support causation. Furthermore, agricultural, industrial, and municipal withdrawal and 
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consumption data would be necessary to increase the validity of TRWR-P considering 
variance between agricultural users in rural farming areas and urban dwellers.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the interdependencies of water 
security, migration, and conflict through research and a system dynamics modeling 
methodology in order to inform military planners and strategists about their influences on 
future military operations. The research addressed three investigative questions primarily 
concerning water security as a way to begin modeling interdependent variables. 
 The research conducted was informative; it incorporated several dynamic global 
issues previously studied separately, or in pairs, but not as an entirety. One of the key 
aspects of water security are the sustainability goals established by the World Bank. 
Those include resource sustainability and efficiency management, reliability and 
affordability of services, and risk management of potential water-related events. 
Governments working towards these goals are currently reducing their probabilities of 
experiencing water insecurity and subsequent migration and/or conflict.  
 Modeling the effects due to the total renewable water resources per capita 
improved our understanding of the problem’s complexity. The uncertainty determined 
through sensitivity analysis identified unanticipated endogenous behavior that appeared 
to be directly related to the delay of migration and death rates. The population decrease 
from the actual migration and death rates increasing over time highlights the potential 
response. Finally, the decay of migration and death rates over time indicates a realistic 
human response as conditions improve.  
Further work would enhance the research and modeling efforts presented in this 
study. Potentially data-rich sources direct from government sites in Iran or high 
resolution satellite observations from projects such as GRACE may offer extensive 
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adaptations. Improving the underrepresented conflict topic in the model using Political 
Instability Task Force (PITF) data may increase realism by disaggregating migration and 
death rates. Specific modeling of horizontal inequalities including civil liberties, level of 
democracy, GDP per capita, availability of primary education, and employment rates 
along with these specific water data overlaid with geospatial data could localize water 
security and help forecast future migration and conflict.  
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Appendix A: System Dynamics Validation Tests (Source: Zagonel) 
System’s Mapping 
1. Face validity (structural assessment through deductive process) – Q: Is the 
model structure consistent with relevant descriptive knowledge of the system? 
2. Validity of decision rules (structural focus) – Q: Do the decision rules capture 
the behavior of the actors in the system? 
Quantitative Modeling 
3. Physical conservation – Q: Does the model conform to basic physical laws such 
as conservation laws? 
4. Dimensional consistency – Q: Is each equation dimensionally consistent 
without the use of parameters having no real world meaning? 
5. Integration error – Q: Are the results sensitive to the choice of time step or 
numerical integration method? 
6. Extreme conditions tests (equations focus) – Q: Does each equation make sense 
even when its inputs take on extreme conditions? 
7. Parameter assessment – Q: Do all parameters have real world counterparts? Are 
they consistent with relevant descriptive and numerical knowledge of the system? 
8. Basic-behaviors reproduction – Q: Does the model generate the various modes 
of behavior observed in the system? 
9. Endogenous behavior-reproduction tests – Q: Does the model pass behavioral 
reproduction tests without the aid of exogenous inputs driving the model in 
predetermined ways? 
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10. Boundary adequacy tests (modes of behavior) – Q: Does the behavior of the 
model change significantly when boundary assumptions are relaxed? 
11. Qualitative problem-behavior test – Q: Does the model qualitatively 
reproduce the behavior(s) of interest in the system? 
12. Boundary adequacy test (problem endogeneity) – Q: Are the important 
concepts for addressing the problem endogenous to the model? 
13. Validity of decision rules (policy focus) – Q: Do the decision rules capture the 
behaviors of the actors in the system? (policy focus) 
14. Assessment of surprise behaviors – Inspection for unusual, novel, unexpected 
or surprise behaviors. Q: Does the model generate previously unobserved or 
unrecognized behavior? Does the model successfully anticipate the response of 
the system to novel conditions? 
15. Behavior sensitivity analysis – Q: Do the modes of behavior generated by the 
model change significantly when assumptions about parameters, boundary, and 
aggregation are varied over the plausible range of uncertainty? 
16. Extreme conditions tests (model behaviors focus) – Q: Does the model 
respond plausibly when subjected to extreme policies, shocks, and parameters? 
17. Behavior anomaly tests (changed assumptions tests) – Q: Do anomalous 
behaviors result when assumptions of the model are changed or deleted? 
18. Family member (generalizability) – Ability to generalize. Q: Can the model 
generate the behavior observed in other instances of the same system? 
Uncertainty Analysis 
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19. Quantitative sensitivity analysis – Q: Do the numerical values change 
significantly when assumptions about parameters, boundary, and aggregation are 
varied over the plausible range of uncertainty? 
20. Policy sensitivity analysis – Q: Do the policy implications change 
significantly when assumptions about parameters are varied over the plausible 
range of uncertainty? Is the level of aggregation appropriate? 
21. Boundary adequacy tests (policy implications) – Q: Do the policy 
recommendations change when the model boundary is extended? 
Forecasting And Optimization 
22. Behavior correspondence – Q: Does the model quantitatively reproduce the 
behavior(s) of interest in the system? 
23. Behavior prediction – Pattern prediction, event prediction, shifting-mode 
prediction 24. Changed-behavior prediction (prior to worry about number 
forecast; behavioral forecast) 
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Appendix B: System Dynamics Test Components Chart 
 
 
(Source: Zagonel) 
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